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Introductory remarks 
Studies on A.G. Baumgarten usually emphasize two main features. 
The first concerns Baumgarten’s foundation of aesthetics as a discipline 
in its own right, based on the emancipation of the empirical sphere from 
pure intellectual principles. The second is linked to Kant’s use of 
Baumgarten’s Metaphysica as a handbook for his lectures on metaphysics 
throughout his whole academic career (1762-1795). Certainly, these two 
points are connected to each other because many of the methodological 
premises of the Aesthetica are placed in the Metaphysica, and the 
acknowledgment of an independent status for the sensibility is one of the 
main themes of Kantian criticism, namely of Transcendental Aesthetics.  
The goal of this paper is to show some further and deeper reasons for 
Baumgarten to mark a division between the so called Leibnizian-
-Wolffian tradition and the Kantian transcendental revolution, and to 
emphasize that these reasons are rooted in the psychology as it is treated 
in Baumgartens’s Metaphysica.  
In the first part we will provide a brief account of the origin of the 
distinction between the concepts of I and soul, as it is characterized in 
modern philosophy. That will let us assess how Baumgarten’s conception 
of subjectivity tries to fill this gap by clarifying some ambivalences, 
which were already emerged in Wolff’s distinction between empirical 
and rational psychology.  
This will require an analysis of the concept of soul, which is directly 
linked to the more general one of simple substance and so to the faculties 
it can be endowed with. As a result we will see that, though Baumgarten 
can still be included within the Wolffian tradition because of the ordo 
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expositionis of his Metaphysica, this work is nonetheless crossed by a 
sort of deep common thread, endowing the system with a consistence we 
cannot find in the “schulphilosophische” predecessors.  
Finally we will try to demonstrate the effectiveness of Baumgarten’s 
original approach by underlining his contribution to the solution of some 
thorny problems faced by Kant in the key moments of the foundation of 
criticism.  
1. Bridging the gap between the I and the soul 
Within the modern tradition Locke seems to be the first to place a 
sharp distinction between the soul as substance (res cogitans) and the 
person as consciousness (ego cogitans), and by doing so he resolves a 
hard ambiguity of the Cartesian perspective.1 At the same time Locke 
raises an apparently opposite difficulty, since there seems to be no way 
left to find a link between the two terms.  
Even Leibniz, whose monadological theory cannot fit with this 
scission, seems in a sense to endorse Locke’s perspective by admitting 
the basic difference between the I and the soul. He obviously maintains 
the continuity between simple monad, soul-monad and I, but in the 
Nouveaux Essais he states that the inherence and permanence of 
perceptions within the monad allow for fixing the continuity of personal 
identity also through the continuity of the soul.2 Moreover the continuity 
of memory is not necessary for Leibniz to produce personal identity, just 
like its discontinuity is not enough to destroy it.3 
From a different point of view É. Balibar has questioned the 
difference between Locke and Leibniz on this point. He rejects Cassirer’s 
opposition of the Leibnizian-Wolffian conception of the soul as vis activa 
to the Lockean one, characterizing the soul as a simple passive faculty.4 In 
Balibar’s opinion, Locke’s concept of consciousness represents the real 
foundation of rational psychology, which Wolff would have relegated to 
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 J. Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, book II, chap. XXVII, § 17, 
hereafter Essay. 
2
 J. Locke, Essay, II, XXVII, § 14. 
3
 G.W. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain, book II, chap. XXVII, § 
9. About this reconstruction see R. Perini, Della soggettività finita. Dalla teoria del 
soggetto alla filosofia dell’uomo, Perugia: Morlacchi, 2005, pp. 219-220. 
4
 J. Locke, Identité et différence. L’invention de la conscience, presenté, traduit et 
commenté par É. Balibar, Paris: Seuil, 1998, p. 76. For the passage addressed by 
Balibar, see: E. Cassirer, Philosophie der Aufklärung, Hamburg: Meiner, 1998, 
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the empirical rank in order to leave space for his own rational psychology. 
This is clearly a bold statement because there are several Lockean passages 
supporting the traditional interpretation. Also, Cassirer’s position surely 
needs to be questioned, but through a different strategy, namely by noting 
that Wolff does not univocally define the soul as a vis activa.5  
Within Wolff we indeed face a tension between the soul conceived 
as a passive faculty and consciousness as foundation of personal identity, 
namely of the I. Thus even if Wolff does not systematically pose this 
distinction, it seems to be consistent since in the Psychologia rationalis 
he defines vires as those capabilities of the soul to express itself “in 
continuo agendi conatu”, and facultates as the passive expressions of the 
soul.6 That reveals Wolff’s debt towards Locke, which seems to be much 
greater as regards empiric psychology, where Wolff takes a distance from 
Leibniz though still keeping his terminology. A good example is provided 
by the necessity to admit a consciousness, which is already implicit 
within the perception, even if the Leibnizian distinction between 
perception and apperception is still endorsed.7  
Thus the importance attributed by Balibar to consciousness within 
Locke’s definition of the soul seems to have some consequences on 
Wolff’s notion of person, meant as a continuity of the self-conscious 
subjectivity.8 On the one hand, Wolff indeed tries to keep himself in the 
Leibnizian track by settling an unsolvable reciprocal implication between 
the empirical perception and the rational apperception, which – as we will 
see – will raise an argumentative circularity. On the other hand, in 
keeping with his logic of the faculties, Wolff is aware of the different 
steps characterizing the elaboration of sensible data and therefore seems 
incapable to provide that unitary image of the psychological subject, 
which is nonetheless still required by formal logic.9  
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 See M. Casula, A.G. Baumgarten entre G.W. Leibniz et Christian Wolff, «Archives 
de Philosophie», 42, 1979, 4, pp. 562-563. Casula underlines that while in the 
Deutsche Metaphysik (1719, hereafter DM) Wolff defined substance as that which 
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6
 C. Wolff, Psychologia rationalis, § 54. Hereafter PR. 
7
 See D. Poggi, L’Essay di J. Locke e la Psychologia empirica di Christian Wolff, in 
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8
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9
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In this sense Wolff shares the difficulty that Locke denounces in the 
Essay, namely: how is it possible to psychologically interpret the sense of 
the identity/continuity of self-consciousness, without deriving its content 
from a sort of “substantial support”?10 Obviously Locke and Wolff reach 
almost the same problem but from totally different paths. Locke is 
focused on the analysis of the cognitive faculties of the subject, while 
Wolff’s treatment deals with a more general consideration of the so-
-called metaphysica specialis. In fact Wolff’s partial distance from 
Leibniz about this psychological issue rests upon a disagreement about a 
topic that is halfway between cosmology and psychology, namely 
monadology, as we will later see.  
What needs to be stressed here is the basic problem from which even 
Wolff’s division of psychology into empirical and rational comes. This 
problem consists in individuating a determined object for psychology, 
which can be investigated from different perspectives without the 
definiteness of its functions being weakened. The main troubles for the 
possibility to univocally define the object of psychology come from the 
need to clarify its status with respect to sensibility. This object is indeed 
constitutively ambivalent: on the one hand it is the object of self-
-consciousness within introspective self-analysis; on the other hand it is 
simply an object just like others in the world. The second possibility 
points to the need of a clear definition of sensibility, and moreover of the 
value attributed to those knowledge gained on the sensible level. It is at 
this stage that Baumgarten emerges as the promoter of a crucial 
turnaround.  
The autonomy of the sensible dimension, from which aesthetics as 
an independent discipline rises, rests upon an implicit but unavoidable 
methodological assumption, namely a unitary conception of the finite 
subject.11 This allows the object of psychology to be defined as the soul, 
in so far as it is endowed with a vis repraesentativa targeted to the 
external world.12 Just like in the Wolffian system, the representations 
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cit., pp. 45-52 (here 51) and M. Kuehn, The Wolffian Background of Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction, in P.A. Easton (ed.), Logic and the Workings of the 
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 J. Locke, Essay, II, XXVII, § 16. See also R. Perini, cit., p. 220. 
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 See: K.E. Kaehler, Baumgartens Metaphysik der Erkenntnis zwischen Leibniz und 
Kant, «Aufklärung», 20, 2008, pp. 117-136 (here 123-124). 
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 A.G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica, Halle, 1739 (1743, 1750), repr. ed. 1779, 
Hildesheim: Olms, 1963, §§ 506-507. Hereafter Met. 
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produced by this vis are based upon perceptions, which can be clear or 
obscure, distinct or confused. Since in the Metaphysica Baumgarten takes 
for granted these kinds of distinctions, we need to refer to the Acroasis 
logica in order to assess his adherence to the Wolffian background. Here 
Baumgarten explains, in keeping with Wolff, that the knowledge 
(identified to the perception) we have within thought consists in the 
perception accompanied by apperception, that is to say by consciousness. 
Thus, since knowledge is equal to perception, perception without 
consciousness (namely an obscure perception) does not raise any thought. 
The same goes for confused perceptions, which are targeted to several 
obscure determinations of the object.13 
So, consciousness is the distinctive mark of both the perceiving soul 
and the thinking subject and moreover it reveals the identity between 
those two concepts. That is always carried out according to a Wolffian 
assumption: to think means to be conscious of something.14  
At the same time, the soul has to count as the sufficient reason of the 
thoughts that are instantiated in it, just like the substance is the sufficient 
reason of its accidents.15 As a consequence the vis repraesentativa of the 
soul constitutes the ratio of the repraesentatum. This repraesentatum 
coincides first of all with the part of the world which is closest to the 
soul, namely the body,16 which interacts with other physical beings within 
space and time, and nonetheless influences the representative and 
cognitive activity of the soul. As a result the soul is defined as vis 
repraesentativa universi but pro positu corporis sui.17 The vis of the 
representing I is influenced by a causality to which it has been exposed so 
far as soul. Baumgarten’s agreement with Wolff seems here to be almost 
complete, but if we focus the attention on at least three points, we can 
perceive a different background setting.  
The first point consists in the Wolffian perceptio totalis18 to be 
understood by Baumgarten in a monadological sense, namely as the 
totality of representations within the soul.19 This allows Baumgarten to 
systematically determine the fundus animae as the “complexum 
perceptionum obscurarum” based on the position of the soul within the 
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 A.G. Baumgarten, Acroasis logica in Christianum L.B. de Wolff dictabat, Halle, 
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 Ibid., § 508. 
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112 Gualtiero Lorini 
body. In other words, the proper modality of knowledge of the human 
subject is recognized as arising from a mixture of distinct and confused 
perceptions.20 At the same time the identity between what is represented 
and how it is represented is essentially kept in a Wolffian way.21 
The second point concerns Wolff’s use of a generic we in order to 
designate the subject of consciousness he analyzes within the Psychologia 
empirica,22 whereas Baumgarten clearly uses the singular I.23  
The last point deals with the demonstration of the actual existence of 
those beings, which are objects of psychology. Within Wolff indeed this 
demonstration is logically consistent, but implicitly supposes a cosmo-
theological premise, namely the dependence of these substances upon 
God as creative cause. As we will see, Baumgarten does not deny God’s 
role within his system, but states the relationship between cosmology and 
psychology in a quite different way. 
However if we take into account not only the goal of Wolff’s 
empirical psychology, but also the way in which he differentiates it from 
rational psychology, we see that it would make no sense to expect Wolff 
to provide a more accurate determination of the subjectivity of the soul in 
its relationship with the empirical dimension.  
Although Wolff is the first to provide a systematic distinction 
between empirical and rational psychology, his definition of the 
relationship between them is quite oscillating, and this ambiguity seems 
to lead to circularity. This can be better assessed by distinguishing 
between the objects of the empirical and rational psychology as 
respectively consciousness and soul.24 As regards this feature the best 
reference point is represented by §193 of the Deutsche Metaphysik, which 
is clearer than the correspondent §20 of the Psychologia empirica. Soul 
and consciousness do not coincide because the latter does not contain the 
essence of the former; but rather within the soul there is also something 
of which we cannot immediately be conscious, that can be known not 
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 On the Eckhartian root of the fundus animae see A. Nuzzo, Kant and Herder on 
Baumgarten’s Aesthetica, pp. 577-597 (here 580). 
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 Met., § 510. 
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 PE, §§ 24-26. 
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 Met., § 504. 
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 See W. Euler, Bewußtsein – Seele – Geist. Untersuchungen zur Transformation 
des Cartesischen „Cogito” in der Psychologie Christian Wolffs, in O.-P. Rudolph, 
J.-F. Goubet (eds.), Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs. Systematische und 
historische Untersuchungen, pp. 11-50 (here 21-24); J.-P. Paccioni, Wolff est-il « 
le vrai inventeur de la psychologie rationnelle » ? L’expérience, l’existence 
actuelle et la rationalité dans le projet wolffien de la psychologie, in O.-P. 
Rudolph, J.-F. Goubet (eds.), cit., pp. 75-97 (here 96). 
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through experience but through syllogisms. Once more the primacy of the 
empirical element seems to be weakened by the necessary reference to a 
logical ratio. Thus, on the one hand empirical psychology has the task to 
confirm within experience the conclusions of rational psychology,25 but 
on the other hand these conclusions receive their principles from the 
empirical ones.26 
Such a paradoxical situation mainly rests upon Wolff’s peculiar 
concept of experience, implying that the empirical and the rational 
approach cannot be separated, but rather must always be distinct and 
connected, because the empirical psychology has evidence but lacks 
demonstrative character, whereas the contrary holds for the rational 
psychology.27 However, despite the undeniable relevance attributed by 
Wolff to empirical data, as the beginning of the cognitive process,28 and 
his explicit methodological purposes, the rationalistic formalism still 
seems to be irreducible.29  
On the contrary Baumgarten’s empirical psychology has a more 
evident primacy within the cognitive process, and this directly depends 
upon the strongly individual determination characterizing the knowing 
subject. Of course Baumgarten warns against the dangerous 
consequences of a superficial merger of reason and experience, but his 
conception of experience, even if apparently similar to the Wolffian one, 
is much more focused on recognizing the intrinsic rationality of 
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 See: C.A. Corr, Christian Wolff’s Distinction between Empirical and Rational 
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Psychologia empirica de Christian Wolff, «Giornale di Metafisica», 21, 1966, 
pp. 589-617; Id., De la nature de l’âme, de la déduction de ses facultés, de ses 
rapports avec le corps, ou la Psychologia rationalis de Christian Wolff, «Giornale 
di Metafisica», 24, 1969, pp. 499-531. On the circularity of the demonstrative 
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Goubet (eds.), cit., pp. 61-73 (here 64-67); F. Piselli, Perfectio phaenomenon, 
Milano: ISU, 1988, pp. 40-41. 
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 See: J.-P. Paccioni, cit., p. 96. 
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 See: J. École, La Métaphysique de Christian Wolff, Hildesheim: Olms, 1990, vol. 
I, p. 78; T. Arnauld, cit., p. 62; Id., Le critère du métaphysique chez Wolff. 
Pourquoi une Psychologie empirique au sein de la métaphysique?, «Archives de 
Philosophie», 65, 2002, 1, pp. 35-46. 
29
 See W. Euler, cit., p. 33. 
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sensibility.30 In fact, since Wolff defines perception through experience to 
be depending on attention31 he is founding even the possibility of 
experience upon pure rational principles. Baumgarten instead puts his 
treatment of experience at the beginning of the exposition of the inferior 
cognitive faculty32 and stresses its pre-reflective character, which 
nonetheless falls into his extensive treatment of the subjective faculties. 
Thus Wolff’s indifference in the use of the words soul or mind to 
designate the object of his empirical psychology only reflects that the 
nature of the subject is not his first goal. Baumgarten’s indifferent use of 
I and soul has instead much deeper theoretical roots. 
Indeed Baumgarten expands the chapter of his Metaphysica devoted 
to empirical psychology in several ways not found in Wolff.33 
Baumgarten’s distinction between the two branches of psychology is 
essentially attributable to the Wolffian conception, insofar as empirical 
psychology draws its claims more from experience, and rational 
psychology does so “by means of a longer series of inferences from the 
concept of soul”34. However Baumgarten’s clear reference to the singular 
subjectivity seems to mark a fundamental distinction.35 The nature of the I 
and its relationship with the body are indeed the proper topics of empirical 
psychology,36 while, turning to the first section of rational psychology, 
concerning the nature of the soul, Baumgarten begins with a definition of 
the anima humana as simply that “soul which is in the closest connection 
[commercium] with the human being”.37 Nevertheless, also in this pure 
rational contest the basis of the treatment is empirical and even refers to 
points that had been treated within Ontology and Cosmology. The goal is to 
repeat from a pure rational perspective what had already been gained in the 
empirical field, namely that “anima humana est vis repraesentativa 
universi pro positu corporis humani in eodem”.38  
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 Met., § 544. About Wolff’s subordination of experience, namely sensibility and 
imagination, to reason see: DM, §§ 371-372 and Philosophia practica universalis, 
vol. II, § 300. 
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 PE, §§ 264-265, 267; PR, §§ 23-25, 372-373. 
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 Met., Sectio III (Sensus). 
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 See: C.D. Fugate-D. Hymers (eds.), A.G. Baumgarten, Metaphysics: A Critical 
Translation with Kant’s Elucidations, Selected Notes and related Materials, 
London-New York: Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 21. 
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 Met., § 503. 
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 Ibid., § 504. See also F. Piselli, cit., pp. 46-47. 
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 Met., §§ 505-513. 
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 Ibid., § 740. 
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 Ibid., § 741. 
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Thus the universality of reason cannot be skipped even on the sensible 
plane, on the contrary only insofar as the empirical results about my soul 
can be extended to the human soul in general, can rational psychology 
demonstrate the soul to be necessarily a spirit, an understanding, that is to 
say a person.39  
The original feature of Baumgarten’s approach to psychology consists 
in fixing the intrinsic rationality of empirical knowledge. Once the 
subjective self-consciousness has been recognized as crucial, perception, 
representation and knowledge can be considered as equivalent, as 
expressions of rationality. Thus, of course the empirical psychology 
remains topical, but at the same time the small number of paragraphs 
devoted by Baumgarten to rational psychology (in particular in comparison 
to Wolff) does not imply the systematic weakening of the latter.40 It is 
exactly by virtue of the described systematic link between the two branches 
of psychology that sensibility can reach its autonomy. The rational 
structure of the sensible sphere is legitimated by the content of the fundus 
animae, namely by those perceptiones praegnantes, which express the 
complexity of the sensible in the unity of the representative act, without 
being predicate of a judgement. 
2. The cognitive value of the fundus animae 
Within his Antrittsvorlesung (1740) Baumgarten states he is going to 
clarify the relevant changes between the first and the second edition of the 
Metaphysica. He also adds those changes to consider, in particular, 
empirical psychology. In the second version of this section he indeed 
matches a particular logic to any faculty of the inferior knowledge, thus 
preparing a sort of propaedeutic to the Aesthetic. It will be characterized 
just like a particular kind of logic targeted both to obscure representations, 
and to clear but confused ones.41 
We need indeed to focus on Baumgarten’s conception of clearness 
and obscurity, therefore the nature of the vis repraesentativa universi 
comes to be a central point, and not by chance it is the main divergence 
theme between Baumgarten and Wolff (and the Wolffians).  
                                                     
39
 See: C.W. Dyck, Kant and Rational Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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In fact Baumgarten’s conception of clarity is more dynamic than the 
Wolffian one, because every perception, as intensive as extensive, is 
endowed with a force [Kraft], which has an impact on other perceptions 
in different ways.42 In case of intensively clear representations this force 
operates insofar as it brings a representation to be distinct, and that 
clarifies Baumgarten’s theory of abstraction, which is not based upon the 
confrontation among the marks [notae], but upon their suppression.43 If 
we consider instead the extension of a representation – that is to say the 
richness of its marks – we see that it is possible to juxtapose both clear-
-obscure as distinct-confused representations. In fact an obscure and 
confused representation can come to be stronger than a clear and distinct 
one only by virtue of a greater number of marks, which makes it 
praegnans44 and vivida,45 two characterizations totally absent in Wolff.46 
The obscure representations constituting the fundus animae are endowed 
with a vivifying force, which allows their position next to the clear ones 
in a sort of reciprocal enrichment.47 
Sure Baumgarten undeniably owes much towards both Leibniz and 
Wolff regarding the starting structure. He takes from these authors the 
determination of clearness as either intensive or extensive. Moreover, in 
keeping with Wolff, he accepts the general division of the faculties of the 
soul between superior and inferior. Yet Baumgarten maintains that 
distinctions among representations in terms of degrees (degrees of 
clearness, distinctness or adequateness) are not sufficient to determine a 
qualitative difference among the knowledge to which these 
representations give occasion. The nature of a knowledge can be 
established only through the rational analysis of the way in which a 
determined representation – more or less clear and distinct – is posed by 
the subject. In this sense Baumgarten’s distinction between intuitive and 
symbolic knowledge is paradigmatic, for Baumgarten does not oppose 
intuitive and symbolic knowledge, but considers them as two sides of the 
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 Met., § 531. 
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 Ibid., § 529. 
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 Ibid., § 517. 
45
 Ibid., § 541. 
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 See. C. Schweiger, cit., pp. 102-103.  
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 See: P. Pimpinella, Cognitio intuitiva bei Wolff und Baumgarten, in M. 
Oberhausen, H.P. Delfosse, R. Pozzo (eds.), Vernunftkritik und Aufklärung. 
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only nexus significativus. By doing so he reveals his approach to be much 
more oriented to the modality in which a being is known than to the 
definition of its essence.48 According to Baumgarten we have an intuitive 
knowledge when the subject’s relationship with the thing represented is 
greater than its relationship with the signs by which the thing is 
represented. The opposite case gives rise to symbolic knowledge.49 It is 
worth noting that the reference to the orientation of subjective perception 
supposes the subject to be both the pole of a relationship with the thing, 
and the criterion to establish which kind of knowledge raises from this 
relationship. Baumgarten does not see in symbolization a technique to 
supply the lack of distinction of a representation, but only a different way 
of the subjective reference to the thing. This redefinition of the 
relationship between intuitive and symbolic knowledge will also be the 
basis for the transition from the epistemic to the aesthetic perspective.  
The conception of truth changes in parallel with the new conception 
of intuition: we no longer speak of an unconditional truth, which is object 
of an intuition totally subtracted from error, but rather of a probability, 
which is unavoidably linked to the point of view of the human subject.50 
The increased involvement of the subject in determining the nature 
of knowledge is possible on the basis of the identification of it as much as 
substance in interaction with others, and as rational reference for the 
analysis of these interactions. As we have seen, Wolff used the terms soul 
and mind without any apparent difference, but without drawing the 
conclusions that Baumgarten does, and now we can clearly assess the 
presumptions of this theoretical difference.  
Also, by treating the question from the perspective of the fundus 
animae we reach the same results we gained by comparing the nature of 
the subject in Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s psychology. Wolff’s empirical 
psychology is characterized by a focus on our experience of the soul, 
whereas Baumgarten’s is more directly targeted to the I, my soul.51  
Since this rational subjectivity is active also in the empirical 
dimension, the definition of this dimension as merely sensibilis sounds 
inadequate. This definition indeed does not show the relationship 
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bridging the sensibility and the faculties of the subject, so Baumgarten 
adopts the term sensitivus in order to make reference, for example, to the 
faculty of imagination.52 Thus Baumgarten reveals here a solid Leibnizian 
perspective, but seems to go even beyond Leibniz as he claims the matter 
of the fundus animae to be rationally analysable.53 In this direction the 
obscure side of consciousness is recognized as the beginning of that 
cognitive process, whose goals are clearness and distinctness, but once 
again this structure supposes a unified conception of the subject. 
We are here facing how Baumgarten takes from the different sources 
of tradition only those elements he needs in order to make his system 
effective. In this case Wolff’s methodological rigour fits with 
Baumgarten’s goal of establishing a new, well-crafted structure for the 
cognitive faculty of the human subject. Nonetheless, to give actual rise to 
this purpose, he needs to rescue some typical Leibnizian topics rejected 
by Wolff, such as monadology and pre-established harmony, as we are 
going to see.  
3. The theoretical dependence of Cosmology upon Psychology  
Unlike Leibniz, who in 1714 had opened both the Principes de la 
nature et de la grace, fondés en raison and the Monadologie with the 
definition of the concept of monad, Baumgarten does not mention this 
concept in his first works, but only in the first section of the Metaphysica, 
namely the Ontologia.54 Here he presents the most salient characters of 
the concept of monad, which will be recalled also in the Cosmology.55 
This spurious treatment is a first clear clue of the distance from Leibniz, 
confirmed by some other factors, which are not so easy to be detected 
because Baumgarten uses Leibnizian terms to pose definitions, whose 
contents are nonetheless quite different from the Leibnizian aim. In § 398 
Baumgarten ascribes to the monad the character of impenetrability, which 
Leibniz does not need to introduce since his monads have no “windows”. 
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This character is consistent with Baumgarten’s cosmological perspective, 
which uses the monads to give reason for the constitution of bodies. Thus 
we can now understand some peculiar characters concerning 
Baumgarten’s description of the relationships among monads: their being 
mutually influenceable, mutable and modifiable,56 their reciprocal link as 
cause and consequence,57 their being in contrast to each other.58 To 
explain this kind of relationships Baumgarten introduces in the following 
paragraphs concepts like motion, rest, etc.,59 but it remains unclear 
whether these categories concern only the physical link between the 
monads or are actually intrinsic to them. 
The consequences of this theoretical divergence from Leibniz are 
even more evident as regards the properties of extension. Within the 
Cosmology Baumgarten indeed cannot avoid the vexata quaestio 
concerning how a set of non-extended monads can generate the body, as 
being something that occupies a determined space. He initially 
characterizes the elements of the extended world as substantial monads,60 
but at the same time he would like to keep their non-spatial character.61 
Yet, from their impenetrability it necessarily results that they must 
occupy a space according to the temporal order of simultaneity. This is an 
exemplar case of the dynamic sketched above: Baumgarten uses 
Leibniz’s words, but in a completely different way from this latter. The 
monads are indeed by no means defined as “mathematical points, in 
which nothing aside from absence of extension is posited”, but as 
“physical points”, which admit extension.62  
With this original formulation Baumgarten opens up to a 
consideration of monadology even more placed into cosmology, with 
particular reference to the philosophy of nature.63 The immediate 
consequence of this attitude is the demonstration of the universal value of 
the theory of pre-established harmony that is extended beyond the simple 
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relationship between body and soul.64 Not by chance this latter is the only 
case in which Wolff admits the pre-established harmony.65 
Of course Baumgarten agrees with Wolff, insofar as the structure of 
being is formal and rests upon the principle of non-contradiction. Yet he 
needs to keep his monadological system and, as a consequence, the pre-
established harmony. To this end he introduces an underdetermination of 
the principle of sufficient reason that was alien both to Leibniz and Wolff. 
It is the principium rationati, claiming that each monad is rationatum of 
the one that precedes it and ratio of the one that follows it.66 The 
corollary of this principle is the principium utrimque connexorum.67 By 
stating this principle Baumgarten aims to provide an intelligible link 
between the monads, so that each of them could represent the whole 
world from the partial perspective of the relation ratio-rationatum. 
                                                     
64
 Met., §§ 448- 463. 
65
 See: J. École, Un essai d’explication rationnelle du monde ou la Cosmologia 
generalis de Christian Wolff, «Giornale di metafisica», 18, 1963, 6, pp. 622-650 
(here 637, 641); Id., La Philosophia prima sive Ontologia de Christian Wolff. 
Histoire, doctrine et méthode, «Giornale di metafisica», 16, 1961, 1, pp. 114-125 
(here 121). For a general overview about this debate see: G. Fabian, Die Lehre von 
der prästabilierten Harmonie und vom psychophysischen Parallelismus in der 
Leibniz-Wolffschen Schule. Beitrag zur Geschichte des Leib-Seele-Problems, 
Langensalza: Beyer & Söhne, 1925, pp. 36-37; L.W. Beck, Early German 
Philosophy. Kant and his Predecessors, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 226, 
405; A. Bissinger, Die Struktur der Gotteserkenntnis. Studien zur Philosophie 
Christian Wolffs, Bonn: Bouvier u. Co., 1970, pp. 24-25; M. Casula, A.G. 
Baumgarten…, cit., pp. 554-556; Id. La metafisica…, cit., pp. 24, 45; Id.., Die 
Lehre von der prästabilierten Harmonie in ihrer Entwicklung von Leibniz bis A.G. 
Baumgarten, in Akten des II. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses (Hannover 17-22 
Juli 1972). Bd. III, Wiesbaden: Steiner, «Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa», 14, 
1975, pp. 397-414; H. Poser, Zum Begriff der Monade bei Leibniz und Wolff, in 
Akten des II. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, cit., pp. 383-395; M. Paolinelli, 
Metodo matematico e ontologia in Christian Wolff, «Rivista di filosofia neo-
scolastica», 66, 1974, 1, pp. 3-39 (here 17-18); B. Paz, Christian Wolffs Ontologie. 
Ihre Voraussetzungen und Hauptdimensionen (mit besondere Berücksichtigung der 
Philosophie von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz), «Aufklärung», 12, 2001, 2, pp. 27-49; 
P. Kobau, Ontologia, in M. Ferraris (ed.), Storia dell’ontologia, Milano: Bompiani, 
2008, pp. 98-145 (here 122); M. Favaretti Camposampiero, Conoscenza simbolica. 
Pensiero e linguaggio in Wolff e nella prima età moderna, Hildesheim-Zürich-
New York: Olms, 2009, pp. 499-500. For problems specifically concerned with 
psychology, see: A.L. Rey, Ontologie et Psychologie dans la pensée de Christian 
Wolff: la raison de l’actualization, in O.-P. Rudolph-J.F. Goubet (eds.), cit., pp. 99-
118 (here 111-118).  
66
 Met., § 23. 
67
 Ibid., § 24. 
 The origins of the transcendental subjectivity 121 
Baumgarten strongly insists on the universal value of this principle, 
which is exactly one of those topics on which, in the preface to the 
second edition of the Metaphysica (1742), he states he has “added some 
new definitions and proofs”.68 
Baumgarten generally intends ratio (Grund) as reason or general 
ground of a being,69 just like a vis (Kraft) characterizes the internal 
relationship whereby the essence of a substance founds the inherence of 
its attributa to itself.70 This meaning of ratio as vis exactly expresses the 
representative totally internal activity of the monad. As regards the modi 
and even more the relationes of the substance we need a further ratio 
because in this case we are dealing with external determinations of the 
substance. The ratio we need at this stage is no more characterized as vis, 
but as causa (Ursache), insofar as it provides the principle of that 
complementum possibilitatis, which coincides with existence. This latter 
meaning of ratio shows the representative activity of the monad to be 
causally conditioned by the position of its body in the world.  
Such a double determination of the nature and activity of the monad 
does not sound surprising, since it is the result of Baumgarten’s peculiar 
characterization of the subject within the Psychologia empirica. The self-
conscious activity of the I-soul not only represents the world, but is at the 
same time conditioned by the position in the world of its closest object, 
namely the body. Thus the subject is ratio of the world insofar as it 
represents the world, but also materially interacts with it. It is not possible 
to separate these two kinds of relationship from each other since the 
subjectivity is structurally concerned with the metaphysical explanation 
of reality.71 
It is worth noting that the theory of the pre-established harmony 
between soul and body is exposed within the Psychologia rationalis, 
whereas it would have been apparently more consistent with 
Baumgarten’s general system to treat it in the section of the Psychologia 
empirica properly devoted to the commercium between soul and body.72 
This choice seems particularly strange because that commercium 
constitutes the issue in which the relationship between psychology and 
cosmology is most evident, namely the point where the representative 
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activity of the simple substance can be appreciated as concretely effective 
within external reality. If we look at this choice by bearing in mind 
Baumgarten’s unitary conception of the subject, we can find a further 
confirmation of this basic assumption. This confirmation deals with the 
relationship between empirical and rational psychology. There is no doubt 
indeed that the pre-established harmony between soul and body can be 
seen as a particular case of the universal pre-established harmony among 
substances. However, since in the former case what is at stake is the soul-
-substance – which coincides with that thought representing the whole 
world – the empirical approach is not enough. Rather, we need a logical 
deduction, which retrospectively shows the common thread running 
through Baumgarten’s whole work.73 That is why the pre-established 
harmony between soul and body must be treated by Baumgarten within 
the Psychologia rationalis. We can now acknowledge that the 
cosmological application of the ontological fundamental principles rests 
upon the representative activity of the subject, whereas in Wolff it was 
psychology needing a cosmo-theological presupposition. 
More specifically: we need to take into account a cosmological 
model – like the universal pre-established harmony among substances –
from the empirical point of view, that is to say from the only point of 
view in which its consistency can be assessed. Yet assessing this 
consistency does not mean to demonstrate the validity of the theory, 
because in order to do so we must ultimately acquire the perspective of 
the logical subject, which allows us to reach the ratio of this model both 
as representative vis of the thinking subject and as causality of the acting 
body. Thus, on the one hand the Psychologia empirica is not subordinated 
to the Psychologia rationalis, but on the other hand it cannot disregard 
rationality, rather needs it, just to claim in turn its rational dignity. That is 
in accordance with Baumgarten’s claim about the rational analysability of 
the representations belonging to the fundus animae. The rational and 
independent character of the empirical field reveals the unity of reason in 
the multiplicity of its expressions.  
Here Baumgarten’s path beyond Leibniz and even more beyond 
Wolff is clear, but, at the same time, Kant’s theory of the two branches of 
knowledge is not accomplished yet. For Baumgarten the value of the 
approach of the finite subject to the object is not a general methodological 
feature orienting and limiting all the claims of reason, but is still 
concerned with a metaphysical system aiming at knowing the being in 
itself.74 
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On this topic Baumgarten seems to still be affected by the Wolffian 
systematic spirit. 
4. Final remarks: two Kantian confirmations  
Despite the above-mentioned oscillations, the importance of 
Baumgarten’s psychology to Kant remains undeniable. Two points in 
particular seem to be the best examples of this influence, one direct and 
one indirect.  
The first point concerns the axiological primacy of psychology that 
Baumgarten states within the Metaphysica. Kant indeed adopts this 
primacy since the Nachricht of 1765-1766, in which he proposes a new 
ordo expositionis for metaphysics. Not by chance the first step of this 
new order is represented by empirical psychology, insofar as it is the 
primary source of experience, after which come cosmology, ontology and 
theology.75 
Kant’s keeping of the traditional ordo expositionis as model for his 
lectures does not weaken the primacy of the I that he detects and highlights 
starting from the beginning of the 70’s by commenting the Metaphysica. 
The clues of Baumgarten’s influence mainly emerge within the course on 
anthropology of the winter semester 1772-1773, the Duisburgischer 
Nachlass of the middle 70’s and the lectures on metaphysics of the late 
70’s. Here the rational dimension of the knowing subject is treated through 
a method and with a terminology leading to the theses of the KrV. 
In the lectures on anthropology of the early 70’s Kant treats the  
I-soul by following an intuitive-analytical method, which leads to a sharp 
primacy of empirical psychology upon the rational one. As an example 
we can take a passage of the Anthropologie Collins, in which Kant states 
that in the analysis of the I lots of the solutions judged by many 
philosophers as pregnant are nothing but immediate intuitions of 
ourselves.76 
Moreover the Duisburgischer Nachlass reveals the conflicting nature 
of the Kantian presentation of categories. On the one hand, they are 
functional in determining the unity of the sensible manifold, on the other 
hand we have (later) to admit their use in the pure application to the I, 
though that does not imply an extension of our self-consciousness. The 
notes of the Nachlass in addition provide some relevant elements dealing 
with the nature of human understanding, whose limitation and finitude is 
fixed through its application to the sensibility.  
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Although almost in the same period Kant is concerned with 
psychology both in the lectures on metaphysics77 and in those on 
anthropology,78 there are no crossing references between these courses. 
This can mean that at this stage Kant is still involved in a deep rethinking 
of the meaning and the role of these disciplines. In a course of the late 
70’s devoted to the whole of the philosophical disciplines, called 
Philosophical Encyclopaedia, he explicitly states that the science targeted 
to the empirical treatment of thinking nature is called anthropology.79  
Thus, on the one hand there is an empirical psychology, coinciding 
with anthropology; on the other hand there is a rational psychology, 
which Kant still treats within his courses on metaphysics. Therefore, even 
if both psychologies are sometimes defined as dealing with the res 
cogitans, it is nonetheless necessary to distinguish the real specific object 
of each of them.80 Empirical psychology considers the self-intuition of 
the I, while rational psychology is concerned with the essence of the 
soul.81  
These are the premises for understanding the second topic on which 
Baumgarten is useful to Kant’s transition towards criticism. In this case 
Kant’s reference to Baumgarten is negative. In fact, as we have seen, 
Baumgarten’s treatment of psychology aims to contrast the dualism 
between I and soul by showing the coincidence of these two terms. That 
happens through a basically Leibnizian theory of substance, which is 
nonetheless settled into a Wolffian ordo expositionis. Of course Kant 
embraces the necessity of going beyond the I-soul dualism within 
psychology, but the direction in which he carries out this overcoming is 
opposite to Baumgarten’s. Indeed Kant does not suggest the I and the soul 
to coincide, rather he bases his metaphysics upon a transcendental I and 
poses the soul on a different level, which cannot be reached with the 
instruments of human finite understanding.82 
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Borrowing a very effective, recently suggested, picture we could 
maintain that Baumgarten is a sort of springboard from which Kant jumps 
through the contemporary theories, in order to reach a new highness. But 
he always needs to come back to Baumgarten in order to get a new push.  
Thus, beyond the above sketched “merits” usually acknowledged to 
Baumgarten, we must recognize that the gnoseological centrality of the I 
and the definitive overcoming of the I-soul dualism are further crucial 
topics to be taken into account for a more comprehensive evaluation of 
the impact of his thought on modernity. From here on, a radical 
rethinking of the internal order of metaphysics and a consequent re-
evaluation of its meaning become possible. Nevertheless, Baumgarten 
was not yet totally confident with the instruments for such a revolutionary 
instance. For this reason it seems that, at least about these themes, we are 
allowed to use Kant to clarify Baumgarten and not, as usual, vice versa.  
ABSTRACT 
Scholars are prone to emphasize A.G. Baumgarten’s foundation of 
aesthetics as a discipline in its own right and Kant’s use of Baumgarten’s 
Metaphysica as a handbook for his lectures on metaphysics. Nonetheless there 
are some further and deeper reasons for Baumgarten to mark a division between 
the so called Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition and the Kantian transcendental 
revolution. The goal of this paper is to take into account these reasons and to 
analyze them in order to show that they are rooted in psychology as it is treated 
in Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. The paper’s aim is to highlight Baumgarten’s 
methodological approach, that is, the use of Leibnizian doctrines, which are 
exposed through the Wolffian order. The radical originality of this procedure can 
be adequately assessed only by virtue of its Kantian development. 
Keywords: Psychologia empirica, Psychologia rationalis, fundus animae, soul, 
subject 
RESUMO 
Os académicos tendem a enfatizar o papel de A.G. Baumgarten na fundação 
da estética como disciplina de seu pleno direito e o uso que Kant faz da 
Metaphysica de Baumgarten como manual de apoio para as suas aulas sobre 
metafísica. Não obstante, há várias e profundas razões para que Baumgarten 
marque uma divisão entre a chamada tradição leibniziano-wolffiana e a 
revolução transcendental de Kant. O objectivo deste artigo é o de levar em 
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consideração estas razões e analisá-las de modo a provar que radicam na 
psicologia, tal como ela é tratada na Metaphysica de Baumgarten. Este artigo 
pretende salientar a abordagem metodológica de Baumgarten, ou seja, o uso das 
doutrinas leibnizianas, que são expostas através da ordem wolffiana. A 
originalidade radical deste método apenas pode ser adequadamente verificada 
graças ao seu desenvolvimento kantiano.  
Palavras-chave: Psychologia empirica, Psychologia rationalis, fundus animae, 
alma, sujeito 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
